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Abstract—The increasing number of devices within the IoT is
raising concerns over the efficiency and exploitability of existing
authentication methods. The weaknesses of such methods, in
particular passwords, are well documented. Although alternative
methods have been proposed, they often rely on users being able
to accurately recall complex and often unmemorable information.
With the profusion of separate online accounts, this can often be
a difficult task. The emerging digital memories concept involves
the creation of a repository of memories specific to individuals.
We believe this abundance of personal data can be utilised as
a form of authentication. In this paper, we propose our digital
memories based two-factor authentication mechanism, and also
present our promising evaluation results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet of Things (IoT) concept continues to
grow, a greater number of personalised services are becoming
embedded within our environment, which requires a greater
level of interaction with our personal devices. With the rapid
growth in mobile and wearable technology, we are seeing
devices increasingly becoming a method of authentication (e.g.
smartphones and RFID enabled cards). For example, many
smartphones can now be used as a payment method [1]. How-
ever, for security or accountability purposes, interaction with
such services often requires user authentication. Unfortunately,
many of the existing authentication mechanisms are considered
impractical, outdated or weak. The problems with current
authentication strategies will continue to hamper computing,
until a more feasible approach is developed.
There are a wide variety of authentication strategies that are
currently in use. However, there are issues with many of them,
which is why many researchers are focusing on developing
new methods, specifically for IoT. The traditional use of a sin-
gle alphanumeric password has long been considered outdated
and insecure. Yet it still remains the most popular form of
authentication (including as part of multi-factor authentication
mechanisms). There have been other proposed methods in-
cluding the use of user specific questions (e.g. place of birth),
secret questions and answers, pin numbers or selected images,
amongst many others. The major weak link in most authentica-
tion mechanisms is the users themselves. The average user has
26 online accounts [2], requiring them to memorise a plethora
of different pins, passwords and secrets, with often more than
one required for some accounts (e.g. online banking). It is
therefore unsurprising that many users reuse their passwords
and secret answers. Many existing authentication challenge
questions are generic, and the answers to which can easily be
found online using websites such as 192.com or from screening
user’s online profiles (e.g. company profiles or social media
accounts). These types of authentication are highly susceptible
to social engineering and phishing attacks.
There have been numerous attempts to address this issue.
The latest initiative is the introduction of multi-factor authen-
tication, which facilitates the use of various factors, which
can include mobile devices, one-time-use password generators
and RFID cards, amongst others. Largely, these authentication
mechanisms are scientifically sound; however, in the real-world
the main challenge is getting users to adopt and integrate these
mechanisms into everyday life.
An emerging area of computing is the concept of digital
memories, which is the idea of preserving user memories into
a physical format stored in an online repository. Such data is
often stored in photographic, video and audio formats, usually
with embedded meta-data (e.g. geotagging). These memories
are highly specific to individual users and could potentially be
an untapped resource of authentication challenge material. The
main difference is that users are far more likely to remember
specific events from their own lives, than a random secret
answer that has been set in haste. The abundance and diversity
of digital memory data means that there is a plethora of unique
authentication challenges that can be created.
In this paper, we propose a digital memories based two-
factor user authentication mechanism for mobile devices. This
mechanism aims to provide a practical and reliable form of
authentication for modern users. The highly specific nature of
digital memories allows for its use as authentication material,
and its complexity can be varied depending upon the nature
of the service being accessed. It is also able to mitigate the
cyber-physical risks associated with emerging mobile biomet-
ric mechanisms (e.g. fingerprint theft and duplication). As an
additional benefit, digital memory data allows for the use of
more interactive forms of authentication (e.g. multiple choice
or interactive maps). Therefore, making it more difficult for
attackers to undertake shoulder surfing, social engineering and
phishing attacks, as well more traditional attacks such as using
brute-force or rainbow tables. To the best of our knowledge,
there have been no other authentication mechanisms proposed
that use digital memories to provide user authentication.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section II will provide background information and existing
research on authentication and digital memories. Section III
presents the initial design of the authentication mechanism,
whilst Section IV presents the evaluation of our design. Section
V outlines some potential applications for the mechanism, and
finally, the paper concludes in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Multi-Factor Authentication
Multi-factor authentication is a more robust form of access
control, whereby users identify themselves in a staged process
using different personal factors. The most commonly used
factors are as follows:
• Knowledge Factor: Referred to as ‘something you
know’, this is information known by the user that they
must provide to progress in their authentication. Such
information may include passwords, PINs and answers
to secret questions.
• Possession Factor: Referred to as ‘something you
have’, which is something that the user must have
in their possession in order to progress with the au-
thentication. Such information may include one-time
password (OTP) generator, ID card or a smartphone.
• Inheritance Factor: Referred to as ‘something you
are’, which are biological characteristics of the user
that are compared for authentication. Such compar-
isons may include fingerprint scan, retina scan, facial
recognition or voice recognition.
• Location Factor: Referred to as ‘somewhere you are’,
this uses the user’s current location as a form of
authentication. The use of GPS-enabled smart devices
has enabled the ease of geographical location confir-
mation.
• Time Factor: Time is often used as logical support
to other authentication factors. For example, by com-
paring the geographical locations of login attempts,
fraudulent logins can be detected if vast geographical
distances are observed within a short time-frame.
There have been numerous multi-factor authentication
mechanisms proposed, for a wide variety of purposes. Some
of the most recently proposed mobile-based authentication
mechanisms are as follows. TouchIn [3] is a two-factor au-
thentication mechanism for multi-touch mobile devices. Users
draw a geometric curve of their own choice (knowledge factor)
using one or multiple fingers. An authentication template is
created based on characteristics extracted from this input, such
as finger pressure and hand geometry (inheritance factor).
Another example is by Abdurrahman et al. [4], who propose
a mobile-based multi-factor authentication mechanism based
on a pre-shared number (knowledge factor), GPS Location
(location factor) and time stamp (time factor). The approach
is designed as a cost-effective alternative to SMS-based multi-
factor authentication.
The importance of using multi-factor authentication tech-
niques has been highlighted in the media recently, by the news
surrounding the LastPass hack [5]. However, throughout our
literature review, we have been unable to find a mobile multi-
factor authentication mechanism similar to ours, that is based
on the user’s own digital memories.
B. IoT Authentication Approaches
In an increasingly digital world, where employees make
use of the Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) movement [6],
the need for improved authentication techniques has been
amplified. The ubiquity of smart devices in the IoT, means
that users regularly access a large number of digital devices
both at home and in the work environment. Consequently, cur-
rent passwords and associated login techniques are becoming
progressively impractical and insecure. As the level of cyber-
attack sophistication increases, identity theft and financial loss
are increasing every year. Digital threats, for example phishing
attacks, are engineered to steal information and make use of
stolen passwords and user accounts for financial profit. One
of the most common phishing attacks is the use of a fake
website, which is used to capture passwords and other personal
information. Subsequently, different technological approaches
have been proposed, as a way to replace the traditional
‘username and password’ login method, both for practicability
and increasing the level of security in place in IoT.
Xuechen et al., [7] for example, propose the use of
USBKey authentication to safeguard devices through a hard-
ware/software security combination. Their research discusses
how USBKey has the ability to improve security in IoT through
storing a digital certificate and authentication algorithms on a
separate device to improve login credential security. Although
the research proposed is focused on the security of LED
displays, the research is applicable in a wider IoT environment.
The main issue with this approach, however, is that the tech-
nique requires the USB to be transported with the user and is
reliant on a USB connection socket to allow access to a device.
Both factors are not sustainably practical in a ubiquitous
environment. For that reason, the future of authentication lies
in a greater automated recognition of the user based on their
persona. Consequently, one solution proposed is the use of
facial recognition for authentication both using 2D images
and 3D capture directly through a webcam. Teymourzadeh
et al., [8] for example, present the use of forgery detection
using data classification techniques and facial recognition on
2D images. Their approach relies on the Back Propagation
Neural Network Classifier (BPNN) to achieve a higher image
classification success ratio.
However, in a ubiquitous computing environment, auto-
mated login, with real-time 3D classification, would offer a
greater practical usage. This has been enforced by the an-
nouncement that Microsoft are incorporating facial recognition
software into Windows 10, allowing users to authenticate
themselves through a biometric process [9]. The main con-
cept behind the software is to eliminate the threat of stored
passwords being stolen; consequently reducing some of the
risks posed by phishing attacks.
C. Digital Memories
The area of human digital memories was first conceptu-
alised in 1945 with the idea of Bush’s Memex [10]. This device
was a place for storing books, records, and communications
and was envisioned as an “enlarged intimate supplement to
memory” [10]. In today’s society, the proliferation of smart
and wearable devices has made this idea a reality. In turn,
this has paved the way for ‘lifelogging’, which refers to the
process of using such devices to automatically record aspects
of our lives in digital form [11]. When we record our lives
we are creating lifelogs or human digital memories (HDMs)
of human experiences. These logs are a digital representation
of ourselves that evolve and grow alongside us and are a
form of pervasive computing that consists of “a unified digital
record of the totality of an individual’s experiences, captured
multimodally through digital sensors and stored permanently
as a personal multimedia archive” [12]. In other words, they
are a combination of many types of media, audio, video and
images that have been recorded using a range of devices
and sensors [13], [14]. As the IoT develops, the range of
information that we have access to and can incorporate into our
lifelogs is growing daily. However, as we gain access to more
data, management of this information becomes more difficult
and structuring accurate HDMs is a challenge.
However, past research into the elements of human memory
can be drawn upon so that HDM data can be structured into
a reasonable representation of a memory. Within our brain,
there are five major memory systems (procedural, perceptual
representation, short-term, episodic and semantic memory) that
regulate everything from languages to skills and knowledge
[15]. Episodic memory, in particular, is related to memories
about personally experienced occasions. Their primary concern
is about the subject’s experiences of temporally dated episodes
or events, and the temporal-spatial relations between them
[15], [16]. When we remember an event, we usually tend to
remember temporal episodes and recall where we were, the
time of the event and what happened. Therefore, when creating
HDMs, it is important to structure this information into events
or happenings that accurately corresponds to our lives in a
manner that facilitates remembering [17].
III. INITIAL DESIGN
In this section, we will provide an overview of the proposed
authentication mechanism. The motivation behind this idea is
that end-users are finding authentication increasingly complex,
frustrating and unmemorable. This method aspires to provide
users with a mechanism that allows them to authenticate them-
selves using their personal digital memories. Their memories
are more likely to be retained in long term memory and will
be far more recallable than pins, passwords or secret words.
This approach has many benefits, such as the abundance
of material providing a plethora of unique authentication chal-
lenges (i.e. not repeating questions). The diversity of digital
memory media (e.g. photos, videos and sound clips) and
subsequent meta-data (e.g. geotagging, timestamps and camera
manufacturer information) allows for various levels of authen-
tication interactivity. Additionally, the level of detail present
in digital memory data provides a high degree of flexibility
in terms of adjusting the complexity or comprehensiveness of
the authentication challenge, to suit the needs of the service
providers.
There are several categories of potential authentication
questions, including:
• Date/Time recognition: Assess whether the user is able
to determine the time, date or chronology relating to
a digital memory event (e.g. what year is this video
clip from? or which of the following images represent
your location at 14:00pm on 01/01/2014?).
• Place recognition: Assess whether the user is able to
determine the location of their digital memory events
(e.g. select the region on the map where this memory
event took place, or select all of your digital memory
images that are from your trip to Portugal in 2012).
• People/Pets recognition: Assess whether the user is
able to identify specific people or animals from their
digital memories (e.g. type the name of the people/pets
highlighted in the video still or image)
• Device recognition: Assess whether the user is able to
identify the device used to capture digital memories
(e.g. identify the manufacturer of the device used to
take this photo).
• Habit recognition: Assess whether the user is able to
identify their own behavioural habits (e.g. which of
the routes shown on the map would you usually take
on a Monday morning?).
• Audio recognition: Assess whether the user is able to
recognise independent audio or audio tracks extracted
from video files (e.g. type the names of the people
that can be heard in the audio clip).
• Ownership recognition: Assess whether the user is
able to recognise media that is from taken their digital
memory, as opposed to stock images (e.g. select those
images you recognise from your digital memories).
As the digital memories concept continues to evolve, there will
be many more potential future categories that will emerge.
There are also several methods of collecting the authenti-
cation responses, which can provide various degrees of inter-
action, including:
• Choice selection: Answers are selected (multiple or
single) using items (e.g. radio buttons or images) that
represent the answers, which can be presented in the
form of text, images, video clips or audio clips.
• Image part selection: Selecting part of an image or
video clip still as an answer (e.g. select a country from
a map or select a person from an image).
• Alphanumeric input: A traditional text box input
which requires users to manually type in their answers.
• Interactive categorisation: Dragging media into de-
fined categorised folders to provide their answers (e.g.
separating six images into two age respective folders).
The exact nature of the authentication challenge changes
randomly, but each is designed to suit the required level of
complexity and comprehensiveness.
A high-level overview of the proposed two-factor authen-
tication mechanism design is shown in Fig 1. There are three
main actors in the mechanism, these are the User’s Smart-
phone (US), Service Provider (SP) and the Digital Memory
Authentication Service (DMAS).
The US serves as an independent platform allowing com-
munications with other actors. More importantly, as this is a
Fig. 1: Authentication mechanism overview
mobile user-authentication mechanism, its physical presence
with the user also becomes an authentication factor.
The SP provides a particular service to the user, but to
access this service using mobile authentication, the user must
first register their device with the SP. The SP does not have
access to any of the user’s digital memory data, nor any of
the account details associated with it, so instead the SP uses
a trusted third party (the DMAS) to handle this.
The DMAS hosts the user’s digital memories in a cloud
environment and provides part of the authentication using their
memory data. Users are able to configure which memories
they wish to allow to be used for authentication purposes.
The DMAS implements many advanced techniques to generate
unique authentication challenges, such as data mining, facial
recognition, image analysis and data classification. The use
of these techniques is imperative for the robustness of the
authentication process. They can be used to determine the
suitability of memories to be used for authentication challenges
(e.g. identifying common landmarks which may make identi-
fying locations easy). Another purpose is to assess the level of
image disparity so as not to provide easy challenges (e.g. being
asked to identify images from the North Pole amongst images
from the Caribbean). To mitigate this problem, the DMAS uses
image classifiers to select visually similar images. An extra
dimension of difficulty can also be added, as the DMAS has
the capability to manipulate images to create trick questions
(e.g. superimpose people into images).
The high-level process of the mechanism is explained in
the following steps, which correspond to the numbering shown
in Fig 1. In the scenario illustrated, the user wishes to access
a service using their smartphone, which has been registered
with the SP, and both the user and SP already hold accounts
with the DMAS.
1) The user requests access to SP’s service, where the
user’s device has been registered previously. The
identity of the physical device is first authenticated
against the SP’s records.
2) The SP negotiates an authentication session with
the DMAS, specifying the comprehensiveness (e.g.
number of questions) complexity (e.g. difficulty of the
questions) for the desired authentication challenge.
3) Upon the user requesting the challenge, it is com-
puted by the DMAS to match the SP’s requirements
and is then sent to the user. At this stage, all po-
tentially useful meta-data has been stripped from any
digital memory data used.
4) The user sends their response to the challenge back
to the DMAS, which validates their answer.
5) The DMAS returns the authentication challenge result
to the SP.
6) If the authentication result is successful, the user will
be granted access by the SP.
This approach is capable of providing a robust mobile-based
user authentication mechanism for IoT. The added benefit,
particularly for IoT environments is that no single party can
provide full authentication or access all the user’s details.
Therefore, if the mobile device is lost or stolen it cannot be
used to gain unauthorised access.
A. Detailed Explanation
The proposed authentication process should ideally be con-
ducted over SSL, in order to maximise security by providing
an additional layer of confidentiality and integrity assurance.
Unfortunately, some IoT devices are computationally limited,
which prohibits them from running SSL [18]. Therefore, to
remain suitable for operation within an IoT environment, the
mechanism needs to be able to function securely without
relying on SSL.
In the proposed two-factor authentication mechanism, we
firstly use the Possession Factor, which is provided by the
physical presence of the US (assessed by the SP). The second
is a Hybrid Knowledge Factor, which is achieved using the
DMAS to generate user-specific Knowledge Factor challenges,
whilst combining them with elements of both Location and
Inheritance factors. In order to satisfy the two-factor require-
ments, neither authentication actor involved (i.e. SP or DMAS)
is able to know all of the user’s authentication information.
As all of the actors in the mechanism will have pre-
existing relationships (e.g. prior account or device registration).
We make the assumption that both the SP and the DMAS
mutually trust each other, similar to those assumptions made by
numerous existing mechanisms including SSL CA trust model
[19], OpenID [20] and external account authentication (e.g.
Facebook [21] and Google Identity Platform [22]). We also
assume that the digital memory data used for authentication
isn’t in the public domain (e.g. on public-facing social media
sites).
A detailed schematic of the authentication process is illus-
trated in the UML sequence diagram illustrated in Fig 2. In
the diagram, symEnc() is a symmetric encryption function that
uses a secret key shared between the actors at each end of
the respective data flow arrow, devID is the device ID, hash()
is a hash function, accKey is the SP’s account key, cCPLX is
the challenge complexity, cCOMP is the challenge comprehen-
siveness and sKey is the session key. request is the challenge
request, uChal is the user’s unique challenge, uResp is the
user’s response to the challenge, authRes is the authentication
challenge result and authToken is the authentication token.
As illustrated in Fig 2, we use symmetric encryption to
secure communications between the actors, as they all have
pre-existing relationships. The SP provides the initial authen-
tication factor (Possession) and then if this can be verified,








Check devID hash is registered
symEnc(sKey)
initiateChallengeSession(hash(accKey),symEnc(hash(devID),cCPLX,cCOMP))
Check accKey hash matches 
and setup session
symEnc(sKey)
Verify sKey hash and generate a 
challenge to suit cCPLX and cCOMP
Verify response is correct
authResult(hash(sKey),symEnc(authRes))
Fig. 2: UML sequence diagram of authentication mechanism
the DMAS’s identity can be assured. The session key is used
as a marker to prevent unauthorised replay attacks, in place of
using nonces. Each sKey is timestamped, has a limited lifespan
and is tied to the initiating IP address. A challenge/response
mechanism is then used to authenticate the US against the
DMAS. These challenges are computed by the DMAS using
the user’s digital memories and the SP’s requirements. Once
both authentication factors have been verified, the SP issues
an authentication token to the US, allowing them to access the
required service.
IV. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the security characteristics of the
authentication mechanism proposed in this paper, we used the
Scyther Tool [23], [24] to provide a formal analysis. Scyther
is an automatic security protocol verification tool, which is
used to identify potential attacks and vulnerabilities. It has
been used to verify numerous security protocols, such as [25].
We used Scyther to evaluate the following properties of our
proposed mechanism:
• Secrecy: To ensure the confidentiality of credentials,
keys, tokens and data is maintained i.e. no intruders
are able to steal them.
• Replay attack resistance: To ensure resistance to at-
tacks whereby communications between two genuine
actors are intercepted and repeated by an intruder, thus
allowing them to masquerade as an authentic actor.
• Reflection attack resistance: To ensure resistance to
attacks where authenticating actors can be fooled into
providing the answer to their own challenge.
• Man-in-the-middle attack resistance: To ensure resis-
tance to attacks where malicious entities are able to
intercept and modify communications between two
genuine actors, without raising suspicion.
Fig 3 illustrates the results obtained from Scyther’s analy-
sis. As can be seen, Scyther has been unable to determine any
weaknesses or feasible attacks against our proposed mecha-
nism. We repeated the Scyther verification ten times, using
both the manually defined claims and Scyther’s automatically
generated claims, and the results remained the same.
Fig. 3: Formal analysis results from Scyther
V. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
The increasing demand for innovative forms of mobile
authentication means that there are numerous potential appli-
cations for our proposed mechanism.
One such application area that the mechanism could be
applied to is the emerging trend of BYOD within corporate set-
tings. In those corporations that do not enforce a blanket ban,
mobile devices (e.g. tablets or smartphones) only require the
wireless key to access the network. Currently, in the majority
of cases it is too cumbersome to introduce authentication into
such a setting. Therefore, there is a growing need for a more
secure and practical process. Utilising the proposed mechanism
would allow the physical presence of the device to be used as
one authentication factor, whilst the correct answer to digital
memory based challenges to provide the other. This would
provide a more robust access control mechanism, allowing
for greater accountability within corporations with BYOD
policies.
Another potential application area is that of online banking.
Current systems require passwords, memorable words and
one-time codes to login. However, instead of remembering
complicated passwords, the user could enter their username
and the last 4 digits of their debit card number but instead of
then entering a password, the DMAS could provide a challenge
based on particular memories. As online banking accounts
are considered high risk, this would require authentication
challenges that could match the higher complexity and com-
prehensiveness expected. Example challenges for both of the
potential applications are shown in Fig 4 and 5.
Fig. 4: Example interactive question
Fig. 5: Example text-based question
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a digital memories based
authentication mechanism for mobile user authentication. We
have provided a detailed overview of the mechanism and
presented our initial evaluation. The results from our evaluation
indicate that protocol would be adequately secure for authen-
tication purposes. The lack of reliance on SSL means that it
would also be suitable for use within an IoT environment. Thus
suggesting that if implemented, it could provide a feasible and
more effective form of authentication.
The novel approach of using personal digital memories for
authentication is able to mitigate many of the risks associated
with current password or generic question based methods (e.g.
shoulder surfing, phishing and brute force). Several forms of
emerging mobile authentication such as biometrics, are highly
susceptible to physical attacks (e.g. fingerprint lifting) meaning
that once such data (e.g. the fingerprint) has been obtained,
the authentication mechanism is rendered obsolete. However,
with our proposed mechanism this risk is greatly lowered,
as the ability to replay, repeat or guess the challenges is
significantly reduced. The degree of personalisation offered
means that users are more likely to know the answer to the
challenge, as opposed to forgetting answers or passwords set
months previously. Additionally, the diverse range of highly
personal memories, provides a more flexible approach to
authentication, as both complexity and comprehensiveness can
be altered in the generation of unique challenges. We hope
that the proposed mechanism is able to replace the generic
and outdated approaches currently in use within mobile user
authentication.
In our future work, we are hoping to expand our initial
implementation into a fully working prototype. This will allow
us to conduct further experiments and determine the full extent
of the acceptance of the concept. We also aim to publish the
details surrounding the functionality and mechanisms utilised
by the DMAS server for authentication challenge creation.
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